This paper presents a simple model that unifies most of the results of the literature on fiscal federalism. The model describes an economy characterized by two levels of government, one public good, and a private good. The predictions of the model are tested by using a new set of measures of fiscal centralization. The main findings are that country size, income per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and level of democracy are negatively correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization. The model is tested using OLS, Tobit, and semi-parametric estimators. The paper also shows that the variables included in the regression are helpful in the prediction of changes in the level of centralization.
Introduction
Across countries we observe very different institutional arrangements and very different levels of fiscal centralization. The recent years have witnessed strong movements toward decentralization and secession (Argentina, Colombia, Ethiopia, the republics of the former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, India, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Belgium, Italy and Spain). At the same time, a divided country has reunified (Germany), large free-trade zones have been created, and there have been important steps towards the economic and monetary union of some European countries. It is therefore natural that decentralization has been at the center of the political and economic debate in many countries.
This paper attempts to identify empirical regularities explaining cross-country differences in the level of fiscal centralization. To set the stage for the empirical work, Section 2 presents a stylized model describing an economy with two levels of government, one public good, and one private good. The central government obtains utility from the size of its budget and the equilibrium level of centralization is determined by a sequential game where the central government moves first.
The key findings of the theoretical model are that the level of fiscal centralization is inversely correlated with: (i) country size; (ii) income per capita; (iii) tastes differentiation; and (iv) level of democracy. The last point is particularly interesting because it may account for the wave of decentralization that has followed the end of the Cold War.
The existing literature on fiscal centralization can be divided into three main branches. The first branch studies the optimal division of powers between the central and local governments (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972) . One of the main results of this branch of the literature is the Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972 ) that identifies the conditions under which it is more efficient for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide an uniform level of output across all jurisdictions. One of the corollaries of the decentralization theorem is that the benefits of decentralization are positively correlated with the variance in demands for publicly provided goods. This is also one of the key results of the model presented in Section 2.
The second branch of the literature concentrates on the role of organization costs (Breton and Scott, 1978) . A decentralized system can reduce mobility and signaling costs, but it is likely to increase administrative and coordination costs. The optimal level of decentralization is the one that minimizes the sum of these costs.
The third branch of the literature emphasizes the benefits of competition among jurisdictions. Tiebout (1956) studies how, in a system with many jurisdictions, the agents can 'vote with their feet' and locate in the jurisdiction that has policies that are closer to their preferences. While Tiebout concentrates on horizontal competition, Breton (1996) studies the benefits of vertical competition. According to this notion, different levels of government, in an effort to increase their 'market share,' provide the citizens with the optimal type and quantity of public goods. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) claim that horizontal and vertical competition among different levels of government can be very important in containing the size of their budgets.
In addition to the fiscal federalism literature, the scope of this paper extends to several issues examined in the recent strand of political economy literature that studies the optimal number and size of nations (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997) and the optimal amount of public goods in countries with heterogeneous preferences (Alesina et al., 1996a,b) . The model presented in this paper constitutes a step in the direction indicated by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) who suggest that it would be interesting to extend their analysis to a framework with multiple levels of government. The presence of two levels of government is the key difference between the model presented in this paper and the one studied by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) ; Alesina et al. (1996a) . The second part of the paper builds a new data set of measures of fiscal centralization and uses it to test the predictions of the model. The theory is tested using both standard techniques (OLS and Tobit) and a semi-parametric estimator that does not require normally distributed residuals. To the best of my knowledge, Oates (1972) ; Wallis and Oates (1988) are the only two attempts to use a large set of cross-section data to study the existence of empirical regularities explaining differences in centralization across countries. Oates (1972) finds that only size and income per capita are significantly correlated with fiscal centralization. Wallis and Oates (1988) study the fiscal structure of the American states. They build a panel of state-level measures of fiscal centralization and find a correlation between a few socio-economic variables (the percentage of urban population, the percentage of whites, and the percentage of farmers) and fiscal centralization. When Wallis and Oates test the model using a simple cross section of American states they find that only size is robustly associated with fiscal centralization.
In the light of the existing literature, the results of this paper seem particularly interesting. In fact, the empirical analysis identifies a correlation between fiscal centralization and two variables measuring the degree of democracy and the degree of ethnic fractionalization. These results are consistent with the model of Section 2 and contradict the idea that it is impossible to find a unique set of variables to explain cross-country differences in fiscal centralization (Oates, 1972) .
A model of fiscal centralization
The model presented in this section extends the framework developed by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) ; Alesina et al. (1996a) , to an economy with two levels of government. The model studies a linear country with area S, population 1 N, and divided into J jurisdictions. S, N and J are assumed to be exogenous. To simplify the analysis, J is assumed to be an odd number.
Since it is not possible to capture in a single model the richness of the vast literature on fiscal centralization, the focus of the model presented in this section is simplification and unification. Having a unified framework will be useful to organize the ideas and guide the empirical analysis presented in Section 4.
The government produces one public good: G (for government). The general (local plus central) government budget constraint is given by T 5 G, where T stands for tax receipts. This can be written in per capita levels as: t 5 g. Per capita consumption of the private good is defined by c. The prices of all goods are normalized to 1. All individuals have the same income y, on which they pay a lump sum tax t, and similar preferences, but they differ in their tastes for the type 2 of public good. Education is an example of publicly provided good on which preferences are often polarized: some citizens may prefer religious as opposed to secular schools or may favor the use of a specific language. It is assumed that the individuals are uniformly distributed over the territory and that the individuals are stratified and sorted according to their preferences for the public good. The latter implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the physical and the 'ideological' distance from the center of the country. The theoretical basis for this assumption is provided by the literature pioneered by Tiebout (1956) . According to this literature, individuals with similar preferences tend to locate in the same community and stratification is an equilibrium condition. The model of this paper assumes a situation where Tiebout-style stratification has already taken place and, since individuals are already sorted according to their preferences, there is no role for mobility.
Although there is no general consensus supporting the Tiebout hypothesis, many empirical studies have found a strong support for neighborhood stratification in American cities (Hamilton et al., 1975; Borjas, 1995) . The idea that individuals are sorted according to their preferences is also central in Alesina and Spolaore's work. These authors claim that: ''If there were no relationship between location and preferences, then there would be no presumption that a country would be geographically connected'' Spolaore, 1997, p. 1030) .
The preferences of the ith citizen are described by a distance-sensitive utility function (Jurion, 1983) :
where g is the per capita amount of government expenditure, l represents im individual i's distance from the center of her country, l the distance from the ij center of the jurisdiction, and u the level of centralization (i.e. the share of the public good that is provided by the central government It is easy to show that the above utility function generates the prediction that the closer an individual's preferences are to the actual government the higher is the ratio between public and private goods that the individual will demand. This intuitive result justifies the use of a utility function like the one in Eq. (1). Not all the utility functions would generate this prediction. A simpler Cobb-Douglas g b utility function of the kind: U 5[g (12a(ul 1(12u )l ))] c would generate
the non-realistic prediction that all individuals demand the same mix of public and private goods, no matter what their preferences for the type of public good are. All the results obtained in this paper can be reproduced using the additive utility function studied by Alesina et al. (1996a) . By maximizing the utility function of Eq. (1) under the constraint y5c1g, it is possible to derive the following demand functions for the public and private goods:
with d 512a(ul 1(12u )l ). Note that ≠g / ≠d .0, ≠c / ≠d ,0. As already
pointed out, each citizen will have different preferences for the quantity of g and c.
The actual level of g provided in equilibrium will then be determined by voting. Note that the idea behind Eq. (1) is that utility is decreasing in the distance from the type of public good provided in equilibrium (i.e. that U . 0). To derive the equilibrium level of centralization I assume that the central government is the first mover and decides the level of centralization. This assumption may seem at odds with democratic voting over the type and amount of public good. Its theoretical background relates to the large political science literature that shows how the agenda setter can, by controlling the order of voting, 3 manipulate the final outcome of an election. The agenda setter has always some power and, in the model presented in this paper, the level of democracy measures how much of this power the government is willing to use to achieve its own goals.
After observing u, the citizens vote on the amount of the public good, and then on the type of the public good. The assumption of sequential decision making (similar to the one used by Alesina et al., 1996a) reflects the budget process adopted in many countries .
In a democratic system the type of public good provided is the one preferred by the median voter. Two types of median voters will be considered: the 'national' median voter, indicated by med, and the median voter of jurisdiction j, indicated by mej. Given the assumption on the spatial distribution of individuals, the median voters will be located at the center of the country and at the center of their 4 jurisdictions, respectively. See Fig. 1 .
At this point it is necessary to investigate who will assume the role of 'central government.' On principle, anybody who promises to supply the type of public goods preferred by the median voter could play the role of central government, but only one individual can credibly commit to provide such type of public good: the median voter herself. Any other individual will, once elected, have an incentive to deviate and implement a policy closer to her own preferences. It is therefore natural to assume that the central government will have preferences for the public good identical to those of the national median voter. Besides sharing the preferences of the national median voter, the central government derives additional utility from staying in power. Following Brennan and Buchanan (1980) view of the central government as a budget-maximizing Leviathan I will assume that the utility that the government obtains from staying in power is a function of the budget it controls.
The central government chooses u in order to maximize the following utility function:
gov Where f [(0,1) indicates the level of democracy: f 50 indicates a dictatorship, while f 51 indicates a perfectly democratic country. The utility function of Eq. (4) has a straightforward interpretation: dictators only care about their budget while democratic governments identify their preferences with the preferences of 4 The assumption that j is an odd number guarantees that the national median voter is also the median voter of the central jurisdiction.
the median voter. Given the discretional power of the agenda setter, the central government will always be able to extract some rent. In the utility function of Eq. (4) the level of democracy measures how much of this rent the central government 5 is willing to extract.
Notice that the probability of being re-elected does not appear in the government's utility function. This is because, given the structure of preferences, the median voter is the only individual for which the Condorcet winning policy is incentive compatible. Therefore she will be re-elected with probability 1.
For the central government the distances from both the center of the jurisdiction gov b
and the center of the country are 0. Eq. (2) can then be rewritten as: V 5fgc 1 (12f)ug. The government maximizes Eq. (4) by solving the model backward. The last decision (and therefore the first to analyze) is on the type of the public good. The type of public good chosen in equilibrium is the one preferred by the median voter (and therefore the central government).
The next step is to determine the amount of the public good to be provided in equilibrium. By applying the median voter theorem and using the demand function of Eq. (2) it is possible to derive the following: Proposition 1. The amount of public good provided in equilibrium is given by:
In a model with only one level of government, Alesina et al. (1996a) show that the optimal quantity of public good depends on the 'median distance from the median.' In the framework presented here, it is possible to interpret (u(S /4)1 (12u )S /4J) as a weighted average of the median distance from the national median and the jurisdiction median and (12m) as the 'ideological' distance from the median. The latter will be close to 0 if a country is very small or if its preferences are homogeneous, and close to 1 for large countries with heterogeneous preferences. By substituting Eq. (5) into the central government's utility function Eq. (4), it is easy to show that the central government will choose the value of u that maximizes the indirect utility function: Proof. See Appendix B.
The proof of Proposition 2 is simple but long and tedious. Its interpretation however is straightforward. Since (i) the central government obtains direct utility from the size of its budget, and (ii) d 51.m, the amount of public good gov demanded by the government is greater than g*. In other words, voters force the central government to decentralize by choosing an amount of publicly provided good lower than the amount preferred by the central government. To increase the amount of public good produced in equilibrium the central government is then required to reduce the level of centralization. Eq. (14) in Appendix B shows that the central government chooses the value of u that sets the marginal cost of centralization (due to the fact that g ,0) equal to the marginal benefit of u centralization (due to the fact that, for a given level of g, an increase in u increases the government budget). Since the ideological distance from the center (12m) depends on the size of the country and on the level of heterogeneity of preferences, it is easy to show that g ,0 and g ,0. Therefore, an increase in the level of a S tastes differentiation or in country size will decrease the amount of public good and the marginal benefits from centralization. A decrease in g by increasing gov gov U /U will also increases the costs of centralization. Both effects will induce g c the central government to reduce the level of u.
One of the results of Proposition 2 is in line with Alesina and Spolaore (1997) finding that democratization should be positively correlated with the equilibrium number of countries and it proves the claim that their analysis can be applied to the division of a country into jurisdictions. A corollary to Proposition 2 is that a 6 perfectly democratic government will set u 50 (see the proof in Appendix B).
Proposition 2 does not provide any result for the effect on centralization of the number of jurisdictions J. A change in the number of jurisdictions will have two opposite effects. On the one hand, an increase (decrease) in the number of jurisdictions will affect m and cause an increase (decrease) of g and therefore of the benefits (from the central government's point of view) of centralization. On the other hand, since g ,0, an increase in J will increase the centralization-elasticity u J of the demand for g and therefore the cost of centralization. The final effect on the equilibrium level of centralization will depend on which of these factors dominates the other.
Taking the model to the data
Proposition 2 generates four predictions. The result that ≠u / ≠a ,0 suggests that countries with polarized preferences for the type of public good should be more decentralized than countries with homogeneous preferences. In countries with homogeneous tastes the central government can induce the citizens to vote for a high level of expenditure in publicly provided good even when the latter are 7 provided in a highly centralized fashion. Hence, we should find a negative correlation between the level of centralization and heterogeneity in the demand of public goods.
Economic theory indicates that the key factors in determining demand are tastes and income. Since the model assumes constant income, I will concentrate on the role of taste heterogeneity. The problem in testing the possible presence of a negative correlation between centralization and taste heterogeneity is how to measure the latter. In Section 3.1 I provide some justifications for the use of ethnic fractionalization as a proxy for taste heterogeneity.
The result that ≠u / ≠f is based on the idea that a democratic government will not try to exploit its agenda setter power. Hence, we should find a negative correlation between the level of democracy and the degree of centralization. This results, besides being in line with Alesina and Spolaore (1997) who find that a world of dictatorships would lead to larger countries, is also consistent with Ades and Glaeser's (1995) finding that dictatorships tend to have very large capital cities.
The central government's utility function suggests that perfect democracies should set u 50 and very repressive dictatorships should set u 51. The majority of countries included in the data set used in this paper fall between these two extremes. Most of the real-world governments are neither perfect democracies (because they are run by self-interested politicians with some agenda-setting power) nor perfect dictatorships (even dictators need to rely on the support of the group of people who put them in power). It should also be noted that, since some public goods cannot be efficiently produced by the local governments (these are goods with large spillover; defense is an example of such a good), even perfect democracies will have levels of centralization greater than 0.
Remember that, in equilibrium,
. 1 and therefore the Central Government would like to gov U c increase public good expenditure above its equilibrium level.
The result that ≠u / ≠y,0 is based on the idea that decentralization is a normal good. Hence, we should find a negative correlation between centralization and income per capita. The existing literature does not agree on the relationship between income per capita and fiscal centralization. Some authors claim that decentralization is a luxury and therefore should be positively correlated with income per capita (Wheare, 1964) . In support of this idea Oates (1972) finds that the level of fiscal centralization is inversely correlated with a country's level of development. Other authors have observed that this relationship tends to disappear when only rich countries are examined. Wallis and Oates (1988) , for instance, show that in developed countries centralization is positively correlated with income per capita. A possible explanation for this finding is that richer countries tend to have more generous redistributive policies, usually implemented by the central government. Casual evidence indicates that some rich countries are extremely decentralized (Switzerland, United States, Canada are examples) while others are highly centralized (France for instance). The regression analysis of Section 4 indicates a strong correlation between income per capita and decentralization.
The result that ≠u / ≠S ,0 depends on the fact that, other things equal, the bigger the country, the smaller m (leading to a large ideological distance from the center (12m)), and hence the quantity of g provided in equilibrium. The central gov gov government will then be forced to decentralize in order to reduce the U /U g c ratio. Hence, we should find a negative correlation between centralization and country size. While casual evidence shows that there are some countries that contradict this prediction (Switzerland is more decentralized than France for example), the regression analysis provides strong support for a negative correlation between size and centralization. The empirical analysis uses Area as the relevant measure of size. Support for using this variable can also be found in the previous fiscal federalism literature. The latter suggests that the benefits of decentralization can be offset by market failures. The most important of these market failures relates to the presence of spillovers across jurisdictions. These externalities are likely to be inversely correlated with the size of the jurisdictions. So, to the extent that larger countries 8 have larger jurisdictions, land area (Area) will be an appropriate proxy for size.
Note that the utility function of the central government (Eq. (4)) depends on the med per capita level of expenditure in g. By changing Eq. (4) into V 5fU 1(12 gov f)uG (i.e. considering total government expenditure rather than per capita expenditure), it would be possible to show that centralization is increasing in 9 population size (≠u / ≠N .0).
8 Switzerland is a notable exception. The small size of its jurisdictions is compensated by characteristics of the territory that limit the mobility of its citizens, and therefore the spillovers among jurisdictions.
9 Tables 13 and 14 show a positive (but not statistically significant) correlation between population and centralization.
Summarizing, the simple framework presented in this section predicts a negative correlation between fiscal centralization and: (i) taste heterogeneity; (ii) democracy; (iii) income per capita; and (iv) country size.
Note that the predictions of Proposition 2 derive from the reduced form of the model of Section 2. Estimating the structural form of the model would require an equation for the behavior of the agents and one equation for the behavior of the central government. This could be done by estimating the following simultaneous model:
Eq. (7) estimates the quantity of public good voted by the economic agents. The equation is identified by the exclusion of the democracy variable (Democracy does not appear in the demand functions of Eqs. (2) and (3)). Eq. (8) The above model is fully identified and could be estimated using two-stage least squares. Unfortunately, TSLS produce consistent but inefficient estimates and,
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with approximately 55 observations, this could be a serious problem. The empirical part of the paper will then concentrate on estimating a reduced form equation of the kind u 5f( y, Area, Fract, Dem) .
One last problem concerns the technique used in estimating the model. By definition, the level of fiscal centralization cannot be higher than 100%. Therefore, I am dealing with a censored dependent variable and, assuming well-behaved residuals, the appropriate estimation technique is the Tobit model. It should be pointed out that Eq. (4) shows that the central government will set u 5100 only if f 50. Hence, only very repressive dictatorships should be fully centralized. The data seem to support this implication. If we exclude very small countries where the scope for decentralization may be extremely limited (Malta and Singapore, for instance), we observe that full centralization is found almost only in extremely autocratic regimes like Myanmar and Zaire (Egypt is an exception).
Data
What follows discusses the variables used in the empirical analysis. A description of the data sources can be found in Appendix C.
Fiscal centralization
To test the predictions of the model studied in Section 2 it is necessary to build a data set of measures of fiscal centralization. Identifying such measures is not an easy task. The main issue is finding a method to quantify the activity of local governments that results from independent decision making. Oates (1972) discusses the conceptual problems involved in the choice of the right measure of fiscal centralization. These problems can be summarized as follows: (i) Different levels of local governments should be weighted in different ways. For instance, large regional governments should be considered more centralized than smaller, city-wide, governments. (ii) Sometimes the local governments collect revenues or make expenditure but have no autonomy in deciding the tax amount to be collected or the type of expenditure to be made. This problem is also related to the identification of the relevant definition of jurisdiction. (iii) The role of intergovernmental grants.
The available data do not allow to address the problems listed above. They divide between the central government and local governments as a group. Information on the appropriate decision units and on the use of the intergovernmental grants is not available. It is therefore impossible to apply a weighting scheme to different levels of local governments or identifying the number of relevant jurisdictions.
Following Pryor (1968) , I define centralization ratios as the percentage of revenues (or expenditure) of the central government out of the total revenues (or expenditure) of the public sector. Two measures of fiscal centralization (Total Revenues and Total Expenditure) for 1975, 1980 and 1985 are built using data 11 from the IMF (1975, 1980 and 1985) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.
The centralization ratios are illustrated in Table 8 Oates (1972) tested for the determinants of fiscal centralization using the data reported in the World Tables (The World Bank, 1969) . These data, following the United Nations accounting conventions, include social security programs in total public sector revenues and expenditures, but do not include social security programs in the revenues or expenditure of the central government. Given the fact that in some countries social security programs represent a big share of the government budget (sometimes more than 30%), not including social security 11 Until 1988 the IMF provided information on central governments expenditure and revenues and on general governments (defined as central plus local governments) expenditures and revenues. The centralization ratios are computed by dividing the former by the latter. A detailed description of the method used to build the data is provided in Appendix C.
programs makes a big difference. Therefore, the centralization ratios reported by the World Tables are much lower than the centralization ratios used in this paper. Since the central government plays a very important role in deciding the size and the scope of social security programs, the measure of fiscal centralization used in this paper should be better suited for a study of the determinants of fiscal 12 centralization than the centralization ratios of the World Tables.
For most measures Yugoslavia is the most decentralized country. Among the industrialized countries Switzerland, Canada, and the United States are the most decentralized. The values for Yugoslavia are suspiciously low. The shares of the federal government in total revenues and expenditures are always below 30%. Although Yugoslavia was a well known case of extreme federalism the above values may be the outcome of an accounting procedure that did not reflect the actual division of powers between the central and local governments.
Heterogeneity in the preferences for public goods
Since tastes are not directly observable, it is necessary to find a proxy for this variable. It is not unlikely that different ethnic groups may diverge in their tastes for publicly provided goods (education is an important example). Therefore, differences in tastes may be proxied by a measure of ethnic fractionalization (Fract). The possibility of a relationship between ethnic fractionalization and tastes was first explored by Oates (1972) who used a dummy variable to 13 differentiate homogeneous from heterogeneous countries.
One problem with Oates' analysis is that a dummy variable dividing the world between homogeneous and heterogeneous countries is a very coarse measure of tastes differentiation. A continuous measure of heterogeneity would be more instructive.
To address this problem, I measure ethnic fractionalization using the data collected by the Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the Soviet Union, originally published in the Atlas Narodov Mira (1964) and then reported by Taylor and Hudson (1972) . This variable ranges from 0 (Korea) to 0.9 (Zaire) and measures the probability that two randomly selected 14 individuals will belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. The same measure has been used in cross-country studies of growth by Canning and Fay (1993) ; Mauro (1995); Castilla (1996) ; Easterly and Levine (1997) . Easterly and Levine study the relationship between this measure of ethnic diversity and similar indices proposed by various authors and find that ethnic fractionalization is a robust 12 Ideally, one should use data for the activities that are decentralizable and therefore exclude defense and social security.
13 He used three measures of differentiation: linguistic, racial, and religious. These dummies assumed a value of 1 for countries that Oates deemed to be homogeneous and 0 for countries deemed to be heterogeneous.
14 The value for Korea was not included in the original data set of the Atlas Narodov Mira but reported (using a different source) by Taylor and Hudson (1972) . predictor of potential ethnic conflicts. Alesina et al. (1996a) use ethnic fractionalization to capture conflicts among groups in the decision of the quantity and type of public goods. To support this idea, they quote a vast sociological literature that finds that preferences and conflicts over public policies are more strongly correlated with ethnic as opposed to income differences.
Most African countries are highly ethnically fractionalized and nine out of the ten most fractionalized countries are in Africa (the tenth one is India). Zaire, Cameroon, South Africa, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Kenya and Zambia have measures of ethnic fractionalization greater than 0.8. Among the industrialized countries, Canada has the highest degree of ethnic fractionalization (0.75), followed by Belgium (0.55), Switzerland, and the USA (0.5). Yugoslavia is the European country with the highest degree of fractionalization (0.75).
Of course, ethnic fractionalization is appropriate to test the model of Section 2 only if one assumes that the different ethnic groups are spatially separated. Support for this assumption comes from the empirical literature aimed at testing Tiebout (1956) model. It is also often observed that different ethnic groups are located in different regions of a country and, in some cases, these regions have large 15 autonomy from the central government.
Democracy
To test for the fourth hypothesis I use the data on political rights assembled by 16 Gastil (1990). Gastil's classification assigns the value 1 to perfect democracies and 7 to countries where most citizens have no political rights. Following , I transform Gastil's 1-7 ranking into a 0-1 ranking, where 0 corresponds to Gastil's 7 and 1 corresponds to Gastil's 1. An alternative source of measures of democracy is provided by the Polity II data set (Gurr et al., 1989) . The results obtained using the Polity II indices of democracy are essentially identical to the results obtained using Gastil's definition.
Estimations of the determinants of fiscal centralization
This section discusses the methods used to test for the empirical predictions described in Section 3.1. The results of the various tests are presented using the centralization ratios for both government revenues and expenditures. As a first 15 A possible interpretation is that the central government 'bribes' ethnically diverse regions by giving them more autonomy. For instance, in a highly centralized country like Italy there are five special regions that enjoy large fiscal autonomy and transfers from the central government. Two of these regions are islands (Sardinia and Sicily). The other three are border regions characterized by large ethnic minorities: French in Valle d'Aosta, German in Trentino Alto Adige, and Slavic in Friuli Venezia Giulia. Similar examples can be found in Canada, Belgium, India, Spain, Switzerland and the UK. 16 Gastil uses the following definition: ''Political rights are rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office.'' step, the model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Then, more appropriate Tobit and semi-parametric estimation methods are used.
Previous work found evidence for the fact that size and income per capita have some weight in explaining fiscal centralization, but most attempts of finding any correlation between fiscal centralization and socio-political variables have not been successful. I start the analysis by estimating two regressions where measures of ethnic fractionalization and democracy are added, one at a time, to a basic specification that includes income per capita and area (these variables are always included given the existing evidence of their correlation with centralization). Formally, I estimate linear forms of the following two equations: CENTR5f (Size, y, Fract), and CENTR5f(Size, y, Dem) . The rationale for the above specifications is to compare the effects on centralization of ethnic fractionalization and democracy. Next, I test the following equation:
Instead of levels, the estimations use the logs of Area and GDP per capita. The log specification improves the fit of the regression and indicates the presence of a non-linear relationship between these two variables and fiscal centralization. Oates (1972) uses ordinary least squares to estimate an equation similar to CENTR5f (Area, y, Fract) . Since the centralization ratios cannot be higher than 100, the independent variables are censored from above and OLS is not the appropriate technique to estimate Eq. (9). It is well known that, with censored data, least squares estimates are biased. Greene (1993) finds that the bias is proportional to the percentage of limit observations. In the data set used in this paper the non-limit observations range between 84 and 90% of the total. Therefore the OLS estimates should have a bias that ranges between 10 and 20%.
Despite its fundamental flaw, I run OLS regressions to compare my results with Oates' work. The results, reported in Appendix D, confirm Oates' finding that size and income per capita are negatively correlated with fiscal centralization. I also find that, as predicted by the model of Section 2, democracy and ethnic fractionalization are negatively correlated with fiscal centralization. These preliminary results, although not very strong (because the coefficients are not always statistically significant), are encouraging. Oates (1972) found that only size and income had a role in explaining centralization and that the proxies for demand 17 differentiation always had the wrong signs.
Tobit estimations
This section uses the Tobit model to test the predictions of Section 3.1. The Tobit model is the standard technique used to estimate equations with censored 17 In his regressions ethnic fractionalization was never statistically significant and always positively correlated with centralization. dependent variables. The assumption of normally distributed residual is crucial for the consistency of the Tobit estimates. Table 2 presents the results for the Tobit estimates when the dependent variable is total expenditure. Now, Fract has high t-statistics for both 1980 and 1985. As for revenues, democracy plays a key role in explaining centralization in 1975. Qualitatively, the results of the Tobit estimations are not very different from the results of the least squares estimates. As expected, the absolute values of the coefficients are higher and, as predicted by Greene (1993) , the differences range from 10 to 25%.
To summarize, the Tobit estimations support the idea that size, income, and ethnic fractionalization are negatively correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization. The coefficients attached to democracy are always negative (supporting the prediction that democratic countries tend to have more decentralized fiscal systems), but statistically significant only for 1975. Tables 13 and 14 in Appendix E show that these results are robust to the inclusion of population or total GDP as a measure of size. When more than one measure of size is included in the regression, only Area shows a robust correlation with fiscal centralization.
The specifications used in Tables 1 and 2 are very parsimonious. To test the robustness of the results, I augmented the regressions with some variables that are likely to be correlated with fiscal centralization. One key issue is that most of these variables are likely to be endogenous with respect to the measure of fiscal centralization. A variable that might play an important role in determining the degree of fiscal centralization is defense expenditure. Augmenting Eq. (9) with defense expenditure does not modify the basic results of Tables 1 and 2 . The coefficients attached to defense expenditure have the expected (positive) sign but they do not enter in the regression in a statistically significant way.
Four regional dummies (Africa, Latin America, Asia and OECD countries) were included in the regression to test for possible regional effects. The introduction of these dummies does not change the results of Tables 1 and 2 . Since different regions may have different slopes, Eq. (9) was also augmented with four interaction dummies. When sub-Saharan Africa is used, some of the coefficients attached to the interaction dummies become marginally significant, but the basic results are similar to the ones of the regressions that do not include the interaction dummies (see Table 10 in Appendix E). The coefficients attached to ethnic fractionalization increase and become statistically significant in all the regressions (including 1975) when interaction dummies for Asia are included in the model (Table 11) . Asian countries seem to be characterized by a positive relationship between fractionalization and centralization and by a negative relationship between democracy and centralization. In interpreting these results one must be careful because all the coefficients have very large standard errors and are unstable over time.
Outliers and robustness
This section identifies some important outliers and study their role in determining the results discussed in Section 4. The next section will use a semi-parametric estimator and bootstrapping techniques to investigate in a more systematic way the role of outliers and the consequences of the violation of the hypothesis of normally distributed residual.
There are two important outliers in the data: Yugoslavia and Zaire. Both countries have high levels of ethnic fragmentation and low levels of democracy, but Yugoslavia has the most decentralized fiscal structure and Zaire one of the most centralized. To analyze the role of these two countries, I dropped Zaire and Yugoslavia from my data set. Table 3 illustrates the results of this experiment when revenues centralization for 1985 is used as a dependent variable to estimate Eq. (9). Column 1 shows that, when only Yugoslavia is excluded from the regression, the coefficient attached to ethnic fractionalization loses most of its explanatory power and the coefficients and the t-statistics attached to Dem increase noticeably. It is interesting to note that the results are similar to the 1975 estimates (that do not include Yugoslavia). Column 2 shows that the opposite happens when only Zaire is excluded from the regression. The most interesting case is the one illustrated in Column 3 where both Yugoslavia and Zaire are dropped from the regression. In this case, both the coefficients attached to Fract and Dem are statistically significant, but the effect of democracy dominates the effect of ethnic fractionalization. The coefficients of Column 3 are very similar to the coefficients of the semi-parametric estimation that will be presented in the next section. Economists and statisticians do not agree on the way one should treat outliers. Some think that outliers distort the estimations and they should be excluded from the model. Others claim that outliers provide interesting information. Paradoxically, Yugoslavia and Zaire seem to be good real-world examples of the situation described in the model of Section 2. In both countries, we observe two opposing forces: low levels of democracy that tend to make the country more centralized and highly ethnically fractionalized populations that push for more decentralization. The outcome probably depends on the cost of repression (a very repressive central government may face international sanctions). It is reasonable to think that the latter will depend on the 'visibility' of a country. So, high levels of repression may have been very costly for a country like Yugoslavia (located at the center of Europe), while the costs of repression may have been lower in Zaire.
The recent history indicates that both democracy and ethnic fractionalization played an important role in Yugoslavia. This country was kept unified and fairly stable by a powerful and charismatic leader: Marshall Josip Tito. Tito's death was soon followed by the break-up of Yugoslavia.
As pointed out in Section 3.1, the values for fiscal centralization in Yugoslavia are suspiciously low and might not reflect the true division of powers between central and local governments. In this case, Yugoslavia would not be a true outlier, but only an observation not accurately measured. Since Yugoslavia has such an important weight in determining the role of ethnic fractionalization, it is interesting to do a sensitivity analysis and explore the effects of different values of its centralization ratio. To this purpose, I re-estimated the equation for revenue centralization in 1985 using different values for Yugoslavia. When revenues 18 centralization for Yugoslavia is between 0.5 and 0.85, both ethnic fractionalization and democracy are statistically significant.
While Area, GDP per capita, and ethnic fractionalization are very likely to be exogenous with respect to fiscal centralization, reverse causation from centralization to democracy may be a problem. The promotion and preservation of democracy was one of the main reasons why the American founding fathers chose a highly decentralized system. De Tocqueville in La Democratie en Amerique praises the highly decentralized American system and claims that such a system is the best protection for democracy. Although the events of the recent years (Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union) seem to indicate a clear causation from democracy to decentralization, it is interesting to explore the reverse causation issue by using an instrument for the democracy variable. The problem is, as usual, the identification of a good instrument. An attempt was made by using the lagged value of democracy. This variable is highly correlated with democracy 19 and therefore has all the statistical characteristics to be a good instrument. The 18 These seem to be reasonable values given the fact that only two countries have centralization ratios lower than 0.5 (Yugoslavia and Canada). 19 However, even if the use of this variable rules out direct reverse causation, there may still exist a systematic relationship between democracy and centralization. instrumental variables estimates (available upon request) are almost identical to the results of the Tobit estimations with no instruments.
Semi-parametric estimations
Similarly to OLS, the Tobit model yields consistent parameter estimates if the residuals are homoskedastic and normally distributed. While ordinary least squares are very robust, and a violation of these hypotheses leads to inefficient but still consistent estimates, this is not the case for the Tobit model. Maximum likelihood methods can only be used to estimate censored regression models if the distribution of the residuals is known. Greene (1993) discusses the consequences of a mis-specification of the distribution of the residuals and shows that the violation of the normality and homoskedasticity hypotheses leads to inconsistent estimates of the parameters.
In recent years many semi-parametric estimators that do not require any assumption on the distribution of the residuals have been proposed. The symmetrically trimmed least squares estimator (STLS) and the censored least absolute deviation estimator (CLAD) proposed by Powell (1984) , (1986) do not require i.i.d. errors but they do not perform well in small samples. The pairwise differencé estimator (PD) proposed by Honore and Powell (1994) requires i.i.d. residuals but performs relatively well in small samples. Monte Carlo simulations have shown that, with a sample size of 50 observations, the PD estimator is often close to the best estimator.
Since the data set used in this paper contains less than 70 observations, Í decided to use Honore and Powell's PD to estimate Eq. (9). (Appendix F containś a description of the Honore and Powell pairwise difference estimator.) Table 4 presents the results obtained by using this estimator. The number in parentheses indicate the probability of a sign switch. These pseudo p-values were obtained by bootstrapping the model 1000 times.
The semi-parametric estimations of the coefficients of Area and y are similar to the ones obtained in the OLS and Tobit estimations. The semi-parametric estimator instead produces very different results for the coefficients attached to ethnic fractionalization and democracy. The coefficients attached to Fract are always lower than the Tobit estimates and the coefficients attached to Dem always higher. Ethnic fractionalization is statistically significant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is revenues in 1985 and statistically significant at the 10% level when the dependent variable is revenues in 1980. In the expenditure regressions, the coefficient attached to ethnic fractionalization is statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.051) only in 1980. Democracy enters in the regression with a statistically significant coefficient for both expenditure and revenues in 1975 and for revenues in 1985.
The results of the semi-parametric estimations are much closer (in the magnitude of both the parameters and their p-values) to the results of Column 3 of Table 3 than to the Tobit results for the whole sample. In the Tobit estimations for the whole sample, Fract has a coefficient of 218.43 (and a t-statistic of 2.73), which is 80% higher (in absolute value) than the coefficient obtained with the PD estimator (210.19). At the same time, the coefficient of the Tobit estimation that excludes Yugoslavia and Zaire is almost identical to the coefficient of the PD estimation for the whole sample. This is an indication that the Honore and Powell method and the bootstrapping downweigh outliers and implicitly correct for some of the problems in the data. To conclude, the PD estimator reduces the explanatory power of ethnic fractionalization and increases the explanatory power of the democracy variable, but still finds a negative correlation between these two variables and the level of fiscal centralization. After exploring the existence of a statistically significant relationship between centralization and a set of socio-economic variables, it is worth asking if this relationship is also economically significant. The results of Table 4 indicate that, for the 1985 sample, a 1 standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization is associated to a 2.8% decrease in revenues centralization. At the same time, a 1 standard deviation increase of democracy in 1985 is associated to a 4.3% decrease in centralization. The effects on centralization associated to changes in income per capita and area size are also very large (ranging from 0.5 to 6%). This allows to conclude that the relationship between centralization and the set of socio-economic variables used in this paper is not only statistically significant but also economically significant.
The role of history
History is the main reason why many scholars claim that it is not possible to use economic theory to explain cross-country differences in the division of powers among different levels of government. Many political scientists have pointed out that, in each country, intergovernmental fiscal relations are the outcome of a bargaining process that is generally unpredictable (Oates, 1972) . In some cases, this bargaining process generated a structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations that, although optimal at the time the process took place, may not reflect the current preferences of the citizens. In other cases, the level of fiscal centralization may have been imposed by a dictator (or monarch) or by international pressure without any consideration for the citizens' preferences. Since the process of adjusting to the optimal fiscal structure requires time, many countries may still be far away from their optimal level of centralization.
Although the model presented in Section 2 is static, it is interesting to study if some of the countries included in the sample are out of the equilibrium and slowly adjusting towards it. An ideal way to control for the role of history would be to include in the regression fiscal centralization measured at the time a given country 20 achieved its independence, but this variable is not available. An alternative method is to augment the regression with the lagged value of fiscal centralization. 20 Attempts to find proxies for the distance from the optimal fiscal structure were not successful. To this purpose I explored variables like social unrest, presence of independentist movement, or number of years since a given country has started its adjustment process. All these variables present conceptual problems. The first set of variables (social unrest and presence of independentist movement) is likely to be the effect and not the cause of a sub-optimal fiscal structure. The latter variable has the advantage of being exogenous but it is not easily measurable. The problem with this variable is to identify a starting point. While this is not very difficult for countries like the UK or the US that have had a very stable political system and the same form of government for more than two centuries, other countries pose very serious problems. How does one deal with cases like France, where there have been several changes in the constitution in the last 40 years? Or Spain? Should one start counting after the death of Franco? What about Italy where there is a large consensus for a more decentralized system but nothing has changed so far? Exogenous shocks, like the end of the Cold War, seriously reshaped the political equilibrium in Europe and modified the status quo. Unfortunately, the available data stop in 1985 and it is impossible to control for these events. The results (reported in Table 5 ) confirm the fact that history is very important. The lagged value of fiscal centralization absorbs most of the variance of the regression (but its coefficient is significantly lower than 1) and reduces the explanatory power of the other variables. Although the explanatory power of Area and y decrease noticeably, the correlation between Fract and fiscal centralization is robust to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. It is not surprising that fiscal centralization is highly correlated with its lagged value. Most of the explanatory variables are either almost constant (like ethnic fractionalization and area) or highly correlated (like GDP and democracy) over time. The fact that, even when the lagged value is included, the other explanatory variables still have some power in explaining fiscal centralization suggests the idea that, while some countries have reached their equilibrium level of fiscal centralization, others are still adjusting towards it.
The very recent history shows that for some countries even the overall borders were not optimal from the point of view of their citizens. It is not surprising that the borders of these countries had not been fixed by a national movement but imposed by outside forces (this is the case for the separation of West and East Germany) or were the output of a highly non-democratic process (Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, for instance). The borders of other countries, especially in Africa, were determined by their former colonial authorities. Even countries with a strong and long democratic history can be far away from the equilibrium level of centralization. The regression therefore pools together countries that may be very close to their optimal fiscal structure with countries that are far away from the optimum and are slowly adjusting to it. If we accept the idea that some countries are out of the equilibrium, the residuals of the regression should be correlated with changes in fiscal centralization over time. Countries where the actual level of centralization is higher than the predicted value (i.e., u .0) should be moving towards a more decentralized i system and vice versa. Table 6 illustrates some anecdotal evidence in support of this idea: Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom are all countries where, in 1985, u .0; since then, all these countries have moved or are moving i towards a more decentralized system. The very large negative residual for Yugoslavia seems to indicate that this country was too decentralized in 1985; this is contradicted by the events that followed Tito's death. The situation is more complex for Canada; the strong movement for the independence of Quebec seems to indicate that the country is too centralized (and therefore contrasts with the negative residual). Another possible interpretation is that, in order to prevent secession, the central government is 'bribing' Quebec with 'too much' autonomy. This idea finds some support in the results of the referendum in which the residents of Quebec voted against secession from the rest of Canada.
Although Table 6 provides some support for the idea that the residuals are negatively correlated with future decentralization, relying on anecdotal evidence to try to identify which countries are moving towards a more or less centralized system may sound suspicious. A more systematic method to investigate the problem is to look at the correlation between the residuals of the 1975 regression and the annual rate of change in fiscal centralization for the 1975-1985 period 1 / 10 22 (defined as Dc5(Centr1985 /Centr1975) 21). The results of this experiment strongly support the idea that the 1975 residuals are negatively correlated with the subsequent changes in fiscal centralization. Table 7 provides evidence for the fact that countries that are out of the equilibrium are slowly moving towards it and that Eq. (9) is a good specification to analyze the empirical determinants of fiscal centralization. Some evidence that countries are adjusting toward an equilibrium can also be found in the fact that the 1985 equation fits the data much better than the 1975 2 equation. When an OLS regression is performed on the same set of countries R increases from 0.47 to 0.56. At the same time the sum of squared errors of the Tobit regression decreases from 4670 to 3842.
One should be careful in interpreting the results of this section. In particular, they do not provide any additional support for the model of Section 2. The latter is set in a purely static framework, while the issues discussed in this section are dynamic. In fact, this section shows that there are changes in the level of centralization that cannot be explained by the set of regressors used in this paper, and calls for further research on the transitional dynamics of the decentralization process.
Conclusions
In the real world, democratization has often been followed by decentralization. This happened in Spain, where the death of Francisco Franco and the return to a democratic system was soon followed by a massive process of decentralization. Other examples are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia and the Ukraine. The end of the Cold War also favored the rise of secessionist (or pro-decentralization) political movements in countries that, although democratic, used to have an extremely rigid political situation. In Italy, for instance, the end of the 'Cold War equilibrium' was soon followed by the rise of a separatist political party. The model and empirical analysis presented in this paper try to shed some light on these recent events.
Many authors think that it is not possible to find a single set of variables explaining the cross-country differences in the degree of fiscal centralization. Oates (1972) attempt seems to support this view. This paper is more optimist on the possibility of finding empirical regularities explaining decentralization. I find that country size, income per capita, ethnic fractionalization, and the level of democracy are negatively correlated with fiscal centralization.
The main problem with the results described above is their sensitivity to outliers and to the use of different samples. While Area and GDP per capita are robustly correlated with centralization in almost all specifications, ethnic fractionalization and democracy have unstable coefficients, highly dependent on the sample used. This is due to the fact that outliers play a very important role in determining these coefficients. Yugoslavia is a particularly troublesome outlier. Its very low level of fiscal centralization plays an enormous weight in determining the coefficients (and t-statistics) attached to democracy and ethnic fractionalization. When Yugoslavia is dropped from the sample, democracy becomes strongly correlated with decentralization. This is also true when more realistic values are used for fiscal centralization in Yugoslavia.
To conclude, this paper shows that there are some regularities that can be used to explain the cross-country variations in the degree of fiscal centralization. In particular, if one believes that outliers are important and that they should not be eliminated from the analysis, then it is possible to conclude that land area, GDP per capita, and ethnic fractionalization are associated with fiscal decentralization. If, however, one believes that outliers should be eliminated, the analysis shows a strong correlation between fiscal centralization and each of land area, GDP per capita, and Democracy. This paper indicates that there are open avenues for further research both on the empirical and theoretical sides. On the empirical side, it would be interesting to identify a homogeneous definition of jurisdiction and augment Eq. (9) with a variable measuring the number of jurisdictions. On the theoretical side there are many possible extensions. The first relates to extending the results to a case of a circular country and relaxing the assumption of perfect sorting of the citizens. It would be interesting to show whether the results of this paper are robust to a case where preferences are highly, but not perfectly, correlated with location.
Introducing income heterogeneity would be another interesting extension. Section 2 shows that the equilibrium level centralization is decreasing in income. Therefore, a model where individuals are sorted according to their income should predict that the policies of the central government are closer to the preferences of the rich. This could be used to explain the fact that upper classes tend to have higher political participation and influence than poorer classes.
The results of Section 6 seem to indicate that the adjustment toward the optimal fiscal structure takes time. This cannot be captured by the static model of Section 2. It would then be an interesting exercise to extend the model to a dynamic framework and try to obtain some information on why some countries reached the equilibrium faster than others or explain the overshooting that characterized other countries (for instance Poland). i.e., for each individual in the second quadrant there is an individual in the third quadrant with opposite preferences who will vote in the opposite way.
Since g ,0 and (U 1U 22U ),0, V ,0. This result, besides being uu gg cc cg uu necessary to compute the effect of the independent variables on the level of centralization, also shows that the government's utility function is concave and therefore the F.O.C. of Eq. (14) is necessary and sufficient for a maximum.
Note that V ,0 because Eq. (14) requires that ( g u 1g).0.
To investigate the role of a change in income let us start by noting that g 5g(bm /m(m 1b )), therefore Eq. (14) can be rewritten as:
Since g50 is a minimum, it must be true that
It is now possible to show that: 
To prove that a Benthamite social planner will set u 50 it is sufficient to show that the social planner's utility function is strictly decreasing in u. Let us start by writing the social planner's problem: 
Appendix C Data sources
This appendix describes the source of the data used. 1. Data on fiscal centralization. The data on fiscal centralization were computed as the percentage of central government revenues (expenditure) on the total (central plus local) government revenues (expenditure). The data on central and total government (general government, in the IMF terminology) revenues and expenditures were obtained from the IMF (1975, 1980 and 1985) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. When the full set of data was not available for the years considered in this study (i.e., 1975, 1980 and 1985) but it was available Even if fundamentally flawed, the OLS analysis is instructive. Using the OLS estimate it is possible to compare the results of this paper with Oates (1972) and conclude that the differences are not only due to different estimation techniques, but also to the use of different data sets. 
Appendix E Sensitivity analysis
Tables 10-14 show the result of the sensitivity analysis.
Appendix FD escription of the Honore and Powell pairwise difference estimator
Maximum likelihood estimators can be used to estimate the censored regression model Table 11 Tobit estimates: Interaction dummies for Asia Table 12 Tobit estimates: Sensitivity analysis using different definitions of size (1985) Revenues ( where j(?) is an odd function. Since it is not always easy to show that a set of 
